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Human reliability analysis (HRA) may be performed prospectively for a newly designed system or
retrospectively for an as-built system, typically in response to a safety incident. The SPAR-H HRA method
was originally developed for retrospective analysis in the U.S. nuclear industry. As HRA has found homes in
new safety critical areas, HRA methods developed predominantly for nuclear power applications are being
used in novel ways. The Petro-HRA method represents a significant adaptation of the SPAR-H method for
petroleum applications. Current guidance on Petro-HRA considers only prospective applications of the
method, such as for review of new systems to be installed at offshore installations. In this paper, we review
retrospective applications of Petro-HRA and analyze the Macando Oil Well-Deepwater Horizon accident as
a case study.

BACKGROUND
Human reliability analysis (HRA) was originally
established in the U.S. to ensure minimal human errors
during weapons assembly work, but the approach was
quickly adapted for other safety critical applications,
particularly control room operations in nuclear power plants.
Since the advent of the first HRA method, the Technique for
Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP; Swain and
Guttmann, 1983), numerous HRA methods have been
developed. These methods allow analysts to determine
causes of human errors and quantify the human error
probability. Yet, much of the focus of HRA has remained in
nuclear power, where risk-informed safety regulation
mandates the use of HRA in risk analyses and plant
licensing.
HRA is nonetheless growing in popularity outside nuclear
power. Safety critical domains such as aerospace, military,
chemical process control, transportation, and oil and gas are
seeing increased interest in HRA to support a broader
application of risk and safety analysis in those fields.
HRA is increasingly applied in oil and gas. Boring (2015)
has noted there are fundamental differences between the
nuclear power and oil and gas domains. Key differences
include: the types and configurations of control rooms and
operations centers, the types of processes being controlled,
the types of technologies being used, the types of hazards
and consequences, the specification level of the written
procedures, and the safety culture at the facilities. It is
therefore reasonable to question many of the operational
assumptions underlying different HRA methods and to
develop new HRA methods or adapt existing HRA methods
to better support the context of oil and gas. From a risk

analysis perspective, nuclear power typically features
considerably more comprehensive probabilistic risk
assessment (PRA) models, which allow easy incorporation
of HRA. Lacking such PRA models in many cases, the HRA
used for petroleum applications must be much more
standalone than its nuclear power counterparts.
One method that’s been developed to date to address these
differences is the Petro-HRA method, which will be
described in the next section.
THE PETRO-HRA METHOD
Developing a New HRA Method for Oil and Gas
Although HRA had been applied in the oil and gas
industry historically to a limited extent, a sudden increase
occurred after the 2010 oil and gas blowout incident at the
Macondo Oil Well, and there were subsequent mandates to
look towards the nuclear industry and their incorporation of
human aspects in risk analysis through HRA. In many
countries, there are new requirements to model HRA,
creating a regulatory framework similar to that found in the
nuclear power industry.
In 2012, the Research Council of Norway and the Statoil
crown corporation funded a new research project to refine or
develop an HRA method specific for oil and gas applications
for the Norwegian oil shelf. Although primarily involving
Norwegian partners (i.e., Norwegian University of Science
and Technology, DNV-GL, Institute for Energy Technology,
and SINTEF, plus Idaho National Laboratory), the approach
would be generalizable to other countries and their oil and
gas applications in drilling, production, and transportation.
The four-year research project resulted in the publication
of the Petro-HRA Guideline (Bye et al., 2017). The Petro-
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HRA method was developed to meet the needs of the oil and
gas industry through reviewing and adapting existing HRA
methods, best practice documents, and research on human
performance. Petro-HRA was created to be a complete HRA
method including steps on: scenario definition, qualitative
data collection, task analysis, human error identification,
human error modeling, human error quantification, and
human error reduction. This is contrary to most HRA
methods where many of these steps are not described. For
example, many simplified HRA methods from the nuclear
power industry focus primarily on human error
quantification. This focus is possible because many other
steps are already specified as part of the PRA. Absent the
PRA, it was necessary to make these implied steps explicit
requirements in the method.
Origins in SPAR-H
After reviewing several HRA approaches, the Petro-HRA
project team decided to use the Standardized Plant Analysis
Risk-Human Reliability Analysis (SPAR-H; Gertman et al.,
2005) method as the basis for Petro-HRA. SPAR-H is
designed to be a simplified method for human error
quantification. Because SPAR-H was originally built around
SPAR PRA models, it came with clearly defined human
failure events that minimized the need for extensive model
building and qualitative analysis. However, when removed
from the SPAR models, SPAR-H lacked clear guidance on
building the HRA leading up to quantification. Thus, the
Petro-HRA method can be seen as filling in gaps toward a
complete SPAR-H HRA method. In addition to filling in
gaps, the Petro-HRA method reconsidered the performance
shaping factors (PSFs) used in SPAR-H. The PSFs account
for the context that primes or decreases human error, and
these proved to be different for nuclear power vs. oil and gas.
The original version of SPAR-H (Blackman and Byers,
1995) was developed to support the Accident Sequence
Precursor (ASP) program at the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC). ASP is invoked when there is a
reportable incident at a U.S. nuclear power plant. The
purpose of this retrospective analysis is to determine the
likelihood that a similar incident could happen again or
elsewhere. Although the probability of the incident
happening is 1.0, because the incident actually happened, the
probability of a similar event happening is usually less than
1.0. The goal of ASP is to determine if the risk of recurrence
requires corrective action at the plant or similar plant. Is it a
given that the same thing would happen again given a similar
context? If so, it’s necessary to implement corrective actions
to reduce the risk of recurrence.
SPAR-H provided a mechanism to support improved
human error quantification. One of the struggles that the U.S.
NRC was facing in ASP was the ability to quantify a wide
range of human errors that resulted from a variety of factors.
Any new method needed flexibility. In addition, the validity
and reliability of the quantification of human errors had been
questioned such that the method needed to have a firm basis
in theory as well as an approach that improved reliability. To

address these issues the decision was made to base the model
on an underlying model of human cognition, namely
information processing.
The SPAR-H development team began with an
information processing model and then identified factors that
would affect each element of the model as well as factors
that might influence the execution of a response elected as a
result of the information processing. This was done to ensure
a level of completeness and transparency in the method in
terms of the relevant psychological elements. The next step
was to do the same for the operational factors found in the
environment of a nuclear power plant. These operational
factors were identified and then attached to the appropriate
elements of the information processing and response model
previously identified. This resulted in a description of how
humans make decisions and respond, and the factors that
would ultimately impact their ability to successfully do so.
In order to produce a workable method, these factors—both
psychological and operational—were then examined to
produce a set of summary factors for use in the method.
These summary factors became the SPAR-H PSFs: available
time, complexity, stress and stressors, experience and
training, procedures, ergonomics and the human-machine
interface, fitness for duty, and work processes (including
crew dynamics). The background information generated
through the model development and factor identification and
definition then provided the information necessary to define
the factors in a way meaningful to those involved in the
nuclear industry.
The final step was then to devise an approach for
quantification. The team believed that by knowing what
factors influenced performance that essentially built the
context of the situation, they could assess their influence and
in turn use that knowledge to modify a nominal error rate.
The team used THERP (Swain and Guttmann, 1983) as well
as the open literature as a source to determine both the base
rates and the multipliers that could be used to assess the
impact of the level of the PSFs. By doing so, the team was
able to create worksheets that could be used in a
straightforward fashion to quantify the human error once the
PSFs were assessed. After the original development, the
method went through a series of modifications and is
currently best described in NUREG/CR-6883 (Gertman et
al., 2005).
Retrospective vs. Prospective Analysis
As noted, Petro-HRA is an expansion of the SPAR-H
method. Yet, an important distinction between the two
variants is that SPAR-H was developed for retrospective
analysis, while Petro-HRA was developed for prospective
analysis. Retrospective analysis refers to investigation of an
incident that has already occurred, while prospective analysis
refers to anticipated performance. Retrospective analysis is
commonly associated with accident investigation, although
most incidents investigated do not rise to the level of severity
of an accident. Prospective analysis is commonly associated
with quantifying the safety of new systems. It is not always
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possible to anticipate every factor that will influence
operator performance within a system that hasn’t actually
been installed yet. As such, prospective analyses tend to be
at a higher level with generic or nominal behaviors assumed
and modeled. When an incident actually occurs, this may cue
a more thorough analysis, in which all details are available.
Some PSFs in SPAR-H are inherently retrospective. In
almost no cases, for example, would an analyst assume
degraded fitness for duty by those using the system. Fitness
for duty is a condition in which the user is not in a mental or
physical state to operate the system. Factors ranging from
psychological stress to medications or psychoactive drugs
may negatively impact performance, but rarely would these
be considered prospectively. Fitness for duty is a PSF that
can be applied retrospectively in the unlikely event that staff
are found to have violated safety protocols related to fitness.
In this paper, we explore the use of Petro-HRA for
retrospective analysis. Retrospective analysis is of particular
interest to the regulators of oil and gas installations, because
it enables the regulators to determine root causes of an
incident after the fact and use those root causes to trend
vulnerabilities at similar installations and prescribe
corrective actions to prevent recurrence. In the next section,
we review the Macando Oil Well accident involving
Deepwater Horizon. This well-documented event provides a
useful example of how retrospective HRA can provide
insights into the causes of events and the prevention of
similar events in the future.

sealing the well. Pressure and flow indications were
available to the drilling team, but due to urgency to finish the
drilling phase of operations they went unnoticed until the
negative pressure test was performed. A supervising
representative from BP overseeing the drilling operation did
raise a concern to the driller; however, any concern was
alleviated by more experienced drilling team members
stating the odd pressure values were not uncommon and did
not merit any significant concerns. Operations resumed,
though the undetected kick had occurred up to an hour prior
and was continuing to worsen over time until ultimately the
blowout alarm sounded at 9:47 PM, followed swiftly by the
explosion and fire. The order to abandon ship was issued at
10:00 PM.
Human Failure Events
The evolution of a well kick event follows in two phases.
First, there is the initial phase prior to the personnel
becoming aware of the well kick (which might be called
normal operations). Even though the well kick has actually
occurred, the personnel involved in the drilling or
completion activities have not yet changed their activities to
respond to the well kick. The second phase entails response
to the well kick after the personnel detect the well kick. At
this point, there is a sudden change in the activities of the
drill operators and support personnel. We have characterized
the event broadly as two Human Failure Events (HFEs)
related to well kick (see Figure 1 for a simple graphical
depiction).

RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS CASE STUDY
Figure 1. Example well kick HFEs in sequence.
Human Actions in the Macando Oil Well Accident
On April 20, 2010, an oil and gas blowout event at the
Macondo Oil Well caused an explosion and fire that resulted
in 11 fatalities, 17 seriously injured personnel, the sinking of
the Deepwater Horizon (DWH) drilling rig, and the
devastating release of millions of gallons of oil into the Gulf
of Mexico (U.S. Chemical Safety Board, 2014). The accident
can be attributed, in part, to a failure to detect the kick and
subsequent blowout or uncontrolled release of oil and gas
hydrocarbons from the well. The backpressure drove the
hydrocarbons through the drilling apparatus to the rig, where
they were ignited in an explosion that subsequently set fire to
the rig. The rig had finished the exploratory drilling phase of
operations and was in the process of performing temporary
well-abandonment activities to prepare the well for the
production phase of operations that another rig was
scheduled to perform.
The well-abandonment activities entail plugging the well
with cement, ensuring the integrity of the cement plugs via a
negative pressure test, and then retracting the drilling
apparatus. The negative pressure test circulates chemically
treated mud that serves as the primary barrier to prevent the
hydrocarbon from traveling through the well and into the
drilling apparatus. The negative pressure created by
circulating the mud simulates the low pressure seafloor
atmosphere in order to verify the cement plug is properly

In reality, the recovery activities consist of many separate
HFEs. However, the general context as represented by the
PSFs for each of those post well kick activities largely
remains the same. Additionally, if there is a failure to detect
the well kick, there is obviously little opportunity for
recovery actions nor the need to model a second HFE.
Petro-HRA Analysis
The nominal or default human error probability (HEP) in
Petro-HRA is 0.01. Petro-HRA, like SPAR-H, uses the
nominal HEP to represent basic tasks performed within the
HFE. These nominal HEPs are then modified using
multipliers corresponding to different levels of influence of
the PSFs.
Petro-HRA makes use of nine PSFs: time; threat stress;
task complexity; experience/training; procedures; humanmachine interface; attitudes to safety, work and management
support; teamwork; and physical working environment. This
list omits fitness for duty and work processes from SPAR-H
and adds attitudes to safety, teamwork, and physical working

This is an author-produced, peer-reviewed version of this article. The final, definitive version of this document can be found online at Proceedings of the Human
Factors and Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting, published by SAGE. Copyright restrictions may apply. doi: 10.1177/1541931213601900

environment as new PSFs. Some PSFs—threat stress and
task complexity—have been relabeled to remove some
ambiguity in the original SPAR-H terminology.
Generally, the Petro-HRA PSFs can have three types of
effects:
x Negative: A negative effect means that the PSF
decreases human reliability. For example, to denote the
negative effect of time would mean to suggest that there
was inadequate time available to complete the task
reliably.
x Nominal: A nominal effect means that the default
applies. Nominal time, for example, suggests that
there’s adequate time to complete the task without
undue time pressure or extra time.
x Positive: A positive effect means that the PSF increases
human reliability. Positive time means that there is extra
time over what is needed to accomplish the task.
For our two example HFEs, the following PSF effects
could be noted. For detection of the well kick (HFE1), the
time available will vary considerably from situation to
situation. Because there are indicators of an impending well
kick such as the negative pressure test, there is generally a
window of time to respond and prevent the event. However,
if these indicators go unheeded, the available time erodes,
and the ability of the drilling crew to respond decreases
proportionately to the decreasing time window. It may be
assumed that when a well kick is impending, the available
time to detect will adversely affect the HEP. The clock is
ticking, so to speak, which can only operate negatively on
the outcome of the event. Of course, there is considerable
task complexity involved, and in the case of DWH, there was
degraded equipment (human-machine interface) resulting in
poor indicators due to the backlog of maintenance activities.
All other PSFs are assumed to be nominal.
The detection of a well kick triggers a change: response
actions are needed in order to prevent a blowout (HFE2).
This operational shift will generally result in multiple
elevated negative PSFs relative to nominal or normal
operations. The time window is closing, but there may also
be elevated negative threat stress and task complexity,
potentially diminished levels of experience and training for
this type of situation, and potentially poor to incomplete
procedures. Underlying the situation, negative teamwork and
management support factors such as breakdowns in
communication, coordination, or command and control may
also manifest. Finally, even in the presence of clear well kick
indications, there was considerable hesitancy to perform an
emergency disconnect due to the extreme cost associated
with that action and job penalties for a false alarm. These
factors suggest the PSF related to attitudes toward safety,
work, and management support was at play.
While detection of the well kick (HFE1) can be seen as a
mostly nominal influence of the PSFs, the transition to
emergency operations to prevent blowout (HFE2) will likely
invoke multiple negative PSFs.
The Basic HEP is defined in Petro-HRA as the nominal

HEP multiplied by the product of all PSF multipliers:
Basic HEP =
1RPLQDO+(3î36)0XOWLSOLHUV
For HFE1 related to well kick detection, the PSF product is
calculated to consider negative effects of time (moderately
negative has a multiplier of 10), task complexity (moderately
negative has a multiplier of 10), and human-machine
interface (moderately negative has a multiplier of 10). All
other PSFs are considered nominal, with a multiplier equal to
1:
HEPHFE1 =
0.01 × 10 × 1 × 10 × 1 × 1 × 10 × 50 × 1 × 1 § 1.0
According to the laws of probability, this number is, of
course, truncated at HEP = 1.0, suggesting that given the
circumstances, the well kick detection would almost
certainly have been doomed to failure.
The same process applies to HFE2 related to the response
to the well kick. Again, multiple negative PSFs are in effect,
including: time (very highly negative has a multiplier of 50),
threat stress (very highly negative has a multiplier of 25),
task complexity (very highly negative has a multiplier of 50),
experience and training (very highly negative has a
multiplier of 50), procedures (very highly negative has a
multiplier of 50), and management support (very highly
negative has a multiplier of 50). Even assuming the
remaining PSFs are nominal, the HEP quickly escalates to
certain failure:
HEPHFE2 =
0.01 × 50 × 25 × 50 × 50 × 50 × 1 × 50 × 1 × 1 § 1.0
A prospective analysis, in contrast, might have assumed
nominal PSFs for HFE1 and primarily weighted time as a
factor in responding to the detection for HFE2. Both would
have resulted in HEPs below 1.0, likely HEP = 0.01 for
HFE1 and HEP = 0.1 (considering a moderately negative
time PSF multiplier equal to 10) for HFE2. In other words, a
prospective HRA would likely have underestimated the
number of simultaneously negative factors contributing to
the event. Indeed, the situation at DWH may be considered a
worst-case scenario, and it would never be assumed that the
confluence of so many negative events would actually occur.
Except, they did.
Discussion
What can be learned from the retrospective analysis of the
Macando Well accident? The analysis would only seem to
confirm that many negative things happened, resulting in the
accident. More telling, however, is that the negative PSFs
implicated for HFE1 involving detecting the well kick
occurred over a prolonged state. The negative PSFs of time,
complexity (given the degraded facility conditions), and
missing indicators due to a faulty human-machine interface
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resulted in an ongoing degraded condition at DWH. While it
is easy to say in hindsight that these conditions primed
failure, the fact that the risks associated with these degraded
states and lack of risk-informed decision making regarding
decisions to finalize drilling and move quickly to production
fatally undermined the safety of DWH. The retrospective
analysis shows not only that DWH was doomed to failure
but that it had been operating that way for some time. Of
course, this assessment is not an indictment on any of the
individuals working on DWH. There is no individual blame
in HRA. Multiple factors put DWH in jeopardy, and the
retrospective analysis reveals factors to watch to avoid
similar incidents at other installations.

benchmarked against other HRA methods that have been
used in retrospective analyses. Additional guidance should
be developed for Petro-HRA to determine the best way to
apply the Petro-HRA steps retrospectively. New guidance
will ensure that information from event investigations is
consistent to inform the HRA.
Retrospective analysis using Petro-HRA promises to be
an important tool to the regulator of oil and gas applications.
It affords a method to extract the primary human
contributions to an event and to mitigate such contributions
in the future. This paper has presented a case study of such
an application and points to the potential for wider use in
the future.

CONCLUSIONS

DISCLAIMER

While the primary goal of a retrospective analysis is to
identify leading indicators to the failure, another goal is to
generalize the findings to other installations. Within nuclear
power, there are a number of commonalities between
nuclear power plants, which makes it relatively easy to
generalize findings to the fleet of related plants. Drilling
rigs may represent more unique configurations that are
increasingly tailored to first-of-a-kind applications. Easy-toreach oil has now been exhausted, meaning it requires
increasingly unique solutions to tap new oil sources. As
such, the generalizability of a retrospective analysis from
one installation to another may be limited. The value in
retrospective analysis may reside mostly as a root cause tool
to ensure similar human performance deficits aren’t
mirrored across different installations.
Several of the PSF multipliers in Petro-HRA are higher
than in SPAR-H. It might therefore be concluded that PetroHRA is more conservative than SPAR-H. This conservatism
should be considered when performing a retrospective
analysis. It may be desirable to benchmark the Petro-HRA
method against other HRA methods like SPAR-H that have
been used retrospectively.
In general HRA, methods have a nominal HEP which is
increased as contextual factors degrade the situation. While
some methods also include the potential to decrease the
HEP through positive factors, the emphasis is certainly on
negative factors. This can lead to a situation where the more
you know about a scenario the higher the HEP becomes (as
fewer and fewer factors are assumed nominal). As a
retrospective analysis often is done on an incident/accident
scenario that has occurred it is likely to produce a rather
high HEP. But the high HEP should not be driven by the
fact that the quality and amount of information from an
event investigation used in a retrospective analysis will
likely be much different than that coming from a
prospective analysis. The Petro-HRA method should be
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of work sponsored by Idaho National Laboratory, an agency
of the United States Government. Neither the United States
Government, nor any agency thereof, nor any of their
employees makes any warranty, express or implied, or
assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the
accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information,
apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that
its use would not infringe privately-owned rights.
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